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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
by the trial judge.26 Thus a technical explanation may well fulfill
the court's duty to a well-educated defendant; while to an unedu-
cated defendant a simple, clear explanation in easily understand-
able terms would seem desirable. The accused should have a broad
understanding of the matter. This could require advising an accused
that an attorney might be able to present a defense for him. Argu-
ably, though, the judge himself should not advise of any defenses
as this would pre-empt the function of the lawyer to whom the
defendant has a right.2 As a minimum in all cases, three of the
criteria stated in Von Moltke would appear necessary to assure a
voluntary waiver of counsel: apprehension of (1) the nature of the
charges, (2) the statutory offenses included within the charges, and
(3) the range 8 of allowable punishments for these offenses. 9
Regardless of any possible clarification that may be forthcoming
with regard to the doctrine of intelligent waiver, it appears that the
dissenting opinion in Butler, by applying the circumstances of the
case to the standards set out in both Johnson and Von Moltke,
reaches the correct conclusion.
GEORGE CARSON II
Contracts-Employment-Remedies For Wrongful Breach
In 1966 the North Carolina Supreme Court re-examined its
prior decisions concerning the remedies available to an employee
who has been wrongfully discharged during the term of his con-
tract. In so doing it took a significant step toward realigning itself
"
8 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
7 Two circuits have reached this conclusion since the requirement of
advice concerning defenses was first set out in Von Moltke. In United States
v. McGee, 242 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1957), vacated, 355 U.S. 17 (1957), the
court reasoned: "The innumerable factual situations that might possibly
afford an accused a defense to the crime charged reveals the absurdity of
the assertion that to be valid the waiver of counsel . . . may be accepted
only after the trial judge had made known to the accused every conceivable
defense that may be available . . . ." Id. at 524. In Michener v. United
States, 181 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1950) the court declares: "Nor is it the duty
of the trial court judge to explain and set out for an accused the possible
defenses he might adduce to the charges against him .... [I]t is not the
duty or the responsibility of the trial judge to give legal advice to an
accused, or to any party . . . ." Id. at 918.
" WEBSTER, NNv COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY (1960), defines range as:
"The limits of a series of actual or possible variations; as, a range of
choice."29 332 U.S. at 724.
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with the great weight of authority on this question. In Freeman v.
Hardee's Food Systems, Inc.,1 the plaintiff entered into a contract
to become treasurer of the defendant corporation for a two year
term. He worked in that capacity for approximately five months,
when he allegedly was wrongfully discharged. He immediately com-
menced this action to recover his salary for the remainder of the
two year term. The conclusion of law reached by the trial court
judge was that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only the amount
due him at the time of the institution of the action.2 On appeal the
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, expressly overruling prior
case law,' stating that Freeman, if entitled to recover, would not
be limited to this amount. The court refused, however, to set forth
the position it would adopt in future cases, as to the amount an
employee in such a situation would be entitled to recover, until the
question was "directly presented and fully argued."4
A majority of jurisdictions support the rule that an employee
who has been wrongfully discharged during the term of his contract
may recover damages for the entire term of the contract, even
though he brings suit before expiration of the term.5 North Caro-
1267 N.C. 56, 147 S.E.2d 590 (1966).
'He was therefore entitled to nothing since he had already been paid
$560.00 more than this amount. Record, p. 15.
'Robinson v. McAlhaney, 216 N.C. 674, 6 S.E.2d 517 (1940) ; Smith v.
Lumber Co., 142 N.C. 26, 54 S.E. 788 (1906).
'The case involved other issues and the plaintiff's attorney in his brief,
probably because of the long-standing rule to the contrary, only in form
objected to the trial judge's conclusion of law. No argument was made for
the adoption of a new rule in this situation. This apparently is what the
court alluded to when it said the question was not "directly presented or
fully argued." Brief for Appellant, p. 4.
Jurisdictions which follow the majority rule are: United States, Pierce
v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 173 U.S. 1 (1899); Arizona, Granow
v. Adler, 24 Ariz. 53, 206 Pac. 590 (1922); California, Seymour v. Oel-
richs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909); Connecticut, Carter v. Bartek, 142
Conn. 448, 114 A.2d 923 (1955); District of Columbia, Keller v. Marvins
Credit, Inc., 147 A.2d 872 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1959); Indiana, Inland
Steel Co. v. Harris, 49 Ind. App. 157, 95 N.E. 271 (1911); Louisiana,
Thurmond v. Skannal, 118 La. 6, 42 So. 577 (1906); Maine, Sutherland
v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64 (1877); Maryland, Hippodrome Co. v. Lewis, 130 Md.
154, 100 Atl. 78 (1917); Massachusetts, Carter v. Gillette, 163 Mass. 95, 39
N.E. 1010 (1895); Michigan, Brighton v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 103
Mich. 420, 61 N.W. 550 (1894); Mississippi, Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
136 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1943); Missouri, Puller v. Royal Cas. Co., 271 Mo.
369, 196 S.W. 755 (1917) ; Montana, Edwards v. Plains Light & Water Co.,
49 Mont. 535, 143 Pac. 962 (1914); New York, Davis v. Dodge, 126 App.
Div. 469, 110 N.Y. Supp. 787 (1908); North Dakota, Miller v. South Bend
Special School Dist. No. 1, 124 N.W.2d 475 (1963); Ohio, Rorick v.
Gilbert, 45 Ohio App. 96, 186 N.E. 756 (1931); Oregon, Smith v. Pallay,
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lina, however, has until now refused to follow the majority rule.
The leading decision on the North Carolina position is Smith v.
Lumber Co.' In Smith the plaintiff was employed by defendant in
February, 1904, for four months. He received his salary for Feb-
ruary and was then discharged. He brought suit for his March
salary before a magistrate and recovered a judgment. The sum-
mons in that suit, however, was dated May 4, 1904, and was de-
livered to the sheriff on May 5. The plaintiff then brought suit to
recover his salary for the last two months. He recovered in the
trial court but on appeal the supreme court held that, since the first
suit was instituted on the date the sheriff received the summons and
on that date two months pay was due, the plaintiff was now barred
from collecting for the second month in this suit. The court then
stated:
[W]hen the contract is entire and the services are to be paid for
by installments at stated intervals, the servant or employee who
is wrongfully discharged has the election of four remedies: 1. He
may treat the contract as rescinded by the breach, and sue imme-
diately on a quantum meruit for the services performed; but in
this case he can recover only for the time he actually served. 2.
He may sue at once for the breach, in which case he can recover
only his damages to the time of bringing suit. 3. He may treat
the contract as existing and sue at each period of payment for the
salary then due .... 4. He may wait until the end of the con-
tract period, and then sue for the breach, and the measure of
damages will be prima facie the salary for the portion of the term
unexpired when he was discharged, to be diminished by such
sum as he has actually earned or might have earned by a reason-
able effort to obtain other employment. 7
The plaintiff had elected the third remedy and was, therefore, en-
titled to recover only his salary for the fourth month in his second
suit.
130 Ore. 282, 279 Pac. 279 (1929); Pennsylvania, Rightmire v. Hirner, 188
Pa. 325, 41 Atl. 538 (1898); South Dakota, Helfferich v. Sherman, 28 S.D.
627, 134 N.W. 815 (1912); Tennessee, East Tenn. V. & G. R.R. v. Staub,
75 Tenn. 397 (1881); Texas, Dixie Glass Co. v. Pollak, 341 S.W.2d 530(Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Vermont, Daniell v. Boston & M.R.R., 184 Mass.
337, 68 N.E. 337 (1903) ; West Virginia, Rhoades v. Chesapeake & O.R.R.,
49 W. Va. 494, 39 S.E. 209 (1901). See generally Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 682
(1963).
8 142 N.C. 26, 54 S.E. 788 (1906). The court in Smith, however, believed
it was adopting the majority rule at that time.7 Id. at 32, 54 S.E. at 790.
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The Smith decision was cited as controlling in Robinson v. Mc-
Alhaney.s In Robinson the plaintiff alleged a contract with a craft
shop for a five year period. Suit was brought before expiration of
the term and the case in part involved whether or not plaintiff was
limited to a recovery of the agreed upon salary up to that date. In
answering this in the affirmative the court set out the four remedies
announced in Smith, and held that the plaintiff had elected to pursue
the second remedy and was, therefore, limited in recovery of dam-
ages to the date of institution of the action.
The ruling in Smith v. Lumber Co. and Robinson v. McAlhaney
limiting an employee's recovery to the salary payments due when
the action was commenced were succinctly declared in Freeman no
longer to be considered authoritative. This is a welcome step in
eliminating an anachronism in our case law.
The soundness of the remedies set forth in the Smith decision
are highly dubious. To require an employee to wait until the end of
the term before he brings the suit might deprive him of all redress
for his injury in many cases, especially in the event of a long-term
contract.' More important, this rule is too dilatory and would re-
sult in great injustice and hardship in many cases where an employee
was financially unable to wait this long.'0
In North Carolina, if an employee cannot afford to wait until
the end of the term, he was forced into the option under Smith of
bringing suit for each installment when it becomes due or else be
limited in recovery to the amount due when the action is com-
menced. Only a few jurisdictions allow an employee to bring suit
when each installment is due" and this remedy is open to the ob-
vious objection that it results in needless litigation and expense to
both parties as well as burdening the courts.
Similarly, to hold that no damages are recoverable except for
the period which has already elapsed when the action is brought is
equally objectionable. As Labatt commented: "[T]he preponder-
8216 N.C. 674, 6 S.E.2d 517 (1940).
o Granow v. Adler, 24 Ariz. 53, 206 Pac. 590 (1922).10Puller v. Royal Cas. Co. 271 Mo. 369, 196 S.W. 755 (1917).11E.g., Fowler v. Armour, 24 Ala. 194 (1854); McMullan v. Dickinson
Co., 60 Minn. 156, 62 N.W. 120 (1895). But see, Zeller v. Prior Lake
Pub. Schools, 259 Minn, 487, 108 N.W.2d 602 (1961) where the plaintiff
was wrongfully discharged from her teaching contract for the 1958-59 term,
the court held she could recover for the entire term although the trial was
in January, 1959. See generally, 1 LABATT, MASTER & SERVANT § 348 (2d
ed. 1913) [hereinafter cited as LABATT].
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ance of authority is so decidedly against this doctrine that it may
safely be treated as erroneous, except in the jurisdictions in which
it has been explicitly adopted."' Numerous decisions indicate that
the action is not one in which the plaintiff seeks to recover wages,
but is for damages for the violation of the terms of the agreement
by whch he was employed to perform services for the defendant for
a stipulated term.13 When the breach is committed the wrong is
complete, and whatever damages flow from the wrong should be
recoverable in one action.-4 The reason given by the court in Smith
for limiting damages to the time of institution of the suit was that
an employer was entitled to diminish the damages by the amount
the employee may or could have received from other employment
and until the full period was at an end this sum would be "specula-
tive." Williston calls this conclusion "wholly indefensible logical-
ly."'" The United States Supreme Court,'6 as well as many other
courts,17 have recognized that the difficulty and uncertainty of esti-
mating damages is no greater in this action than if the plaintiff had
sued the defendant in tort to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained in his service.
The jurisdictions that follow the majority rule have the jury
consider in estimating damages the wages the plaintiff would have
earned under the contract, the probability that he will live to the
end of the contract period, or that his ability to work will continue,
and any other uncertainties growing out of the terms of the contract
as well as the likelihood that he would be able to earn money in
other comparable work during the time.' s In most cases by the time
the trial takes place the plaintiff will have found other employment
and it should be even less difficult to estimate his future earnings.
Furthermore, that damages are speculative "seems to be properly
considered rather as one of the elements to be taken into account in
assessing the prospective damages ... than as a specific reason for
121 LABATT § 363(d), at 1145.
" See, e.g., Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909);Carter v. Gillette, 163 Mass. 95, 39 N.E. 1010 (1895).
", Edwards v. Plains Light & Water Co., 49 Mont. 535, 143 Pac. 962
(1914).
" 5 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 1362 (rev. ed. 1936).
"Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 173 U.S. 1 (1899).
'"E.g., Carter v. Gillette, 163 Mass. 95, 39 N.E. 1010 (1895); Dixie
Glass Co. v. Pollak, 341 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).18Ibid.
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refusing altogether to assess such damages."' 9 Moreover, if the de-
fendant wrongfully discharges the plaintiff, he should be taken to
have understood that if he did not wish to be subjected to such
damages, he should have kept his agreement.20
It is submitted that the court in Freeman was correct in recog-
nizing the inadequacies of the Smith and Robinson decisions. The
court has now set the stage so that in the next case raising the issue
counsel should present the reasons supporting the majority rule
which allows damages for the entire contract period. When this
occurs the court will probably adopt the sounder majority rule.
JAmES ALFRED MANNINO
Corporations-Specific Enforcement of Shareholder Agreements
Shareholder voting agreements to achieve control of a corpora-
tion are generally recognized as lawful.' Difficulty arises, however,
when a shareholder breaches a voting agreement, and the court is
faced with the dilemma of awarding the inadequate relief of money
damages,2 or specifically enforcing the agreement, thereby substi-
tuting the court's direction for the will of the majority.
10 LABATT § 363(e), at 1145.
" E.g., Granow v. Adler, 24 Ariz. 53, 206 Pac. 590 (1922) ; Seymour v.
Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909); Carter v. Gillette, 163 Mass.
95, 39 N.E. 1010 (1895).
'Voting agreements should be distinguished from voting trusts. Voting
trusts are created by the transfer of shares to trustees, who vote these
shares as dictated by the agreement. Statutes now usually control both the
formation and duration of these agreements. If a voting trust is inconsistent
with the statute it is generally held void. Voting agreements are contracts
among shareholders to vote stock in a specified manner. Typically, statutory
control is not present. HENN, CORPORATxONS §§ 199-200 (1961).
Shareholders may combine to gain control of a corporation so long as
"[T]hey do not contravene any express charter or statutory provision or
contemplate any fraud, oppression or wrong against other stockholders or
other illegal objects." Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 320, 119 N.E. 559,
561 (1918) (dictum). See, e.g., Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry. Co.,
115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897); Bator v. United Sausage Co., 138 Conn.
18, 81 A.2d 442 (1951); Wolf v. Arant, 88 Ga. App. 568, 77 S.E.2d 116
(1953); E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288
(1954); Trefethan v. Amazeen, 93 N.H. 110, 36 A.2d 266 (1944); Katcher
v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (1953); Clark v. Dodge, 269
N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
Courts often recognize the legality of shareholder agreements in a nega-
tive manner, by stating that the "contract is not per se invalid." For a
collection of such cases see Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 799, 802-04 (1956). See
Generally 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2064 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1952).
Compare E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d
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